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1 Introduction 
 
The impartiality of judges often expressed in the Latin maxim nemo iudex in propria causa 
interpreted to mean that no man should be a judge in his own cause together with the right of 
fair hearing makes up the right to natural justice. This principle is recognised by a number of 
provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. Section 165(4) provides 
that the organs of state shall, through legislative and other measures, assist and protect the 
courts to ensure their independence, impartiality, dignity, accessibility and effectiveness. 
Furthermore, section 34 of the same Constitution provides that everyone has the right to have 
any dispute resolved by the application of law by a court or, where appropriate another 
independent and impartial tribunal or forum. Article 6(1) of the European Convention of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 as incorporated in the Human Rights Act 
1988, applicable in England since 2000 provides that: 
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations … everyone is entitled to a 
fair hearing … by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. 
The independence of courts and impartiality of judges are closely related1
                                            
*  Visiting Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, North West University (Potchefstroom Campus) and Associate 
Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, Rivers State University of Science and Technology, Nkpolu, Port 
Harcourt, Rivers State. 
 in that they operate 
to sustain public confidence in the administration of justice. 
1 See the European Court of Human Rights in Findlay v UK 1997 24 EHRR 221, par 73: "… in order to 
establish whether a tribunal can be considered as 'independent', regard must be had inter alia to the matter 
of appointment of its members and their term of office, the existence of guarantees against outside 
ES NWAUCHE   PER/PELJ 2004(7)2 
 
 3/204 
This article advocates a return to the use of the manifest justice principle enshrined in the 
words of Lord Hewart CJ in R v Sussex Justices ex parte McCarthy2 that it is "of fundamental 
importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be 
seen to be done"3 as the proper context4 for the application of the tests of "reasonable 
apprehension of bias" adopted by South African courts5 and "real possibility of bias" adopted 
by English courts6 in the consideration of allegation of apparent bias. It will be argued that 
the tests are different7 and that while the English test is a move of English courts from the 
real danger/likelihood test in consonance with an overwhelming global jurisprudence,8 the 
South African test is a move away from this global jurisprudence and arguably back to the 
real danger/likelihood test. It is also argued that the reasonable apprehension test as applied 
by the minority in SACCAWU v Irvin & Johnson Ltd (Seafoods Division Fish Processing)9
                                                                                                                                       
pressures and the question whether the body presents an appearance of independence. As to the question 
of 'impartiality' there are two aspects to this requirement. First, the tribunal must be subjectively free of 
personal prejudice or bias. Secondly it must also be impartial from an objective viewpoint, that it must 
offer sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt in this respect." 
2  R v Sussex Justices ex parte McCarthy [1923] All ER 233. Hereafter Sussex Justices. 
3  Ibid at p 234. 
4  See R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Daly [2001] 3 All ER 433 (HL) approved in 
Take and Save Trading CC v Standard Bank of SA Limited 2004 (4) SA 1 (SCA). 
5  See President of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football Union (2) 1999 (4) SA 147. 
Hereafter SARFU 2. 
6  The House of Lords in Porter v Magill [2002] 1 All ER 465 (HL) (hereafter Porter) modified the real 
likelihood/real danger test formulated in R v Gough [1993] 2 All ER 724 (HL) (hereafter Gough). 
7  In R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and others ex parte Pinochet Ungarte (No. 2) 
[1999] All ER 577 (hereafter Pinochet 2), Lord Hope comparing the "real likelihood test" – modified into 
the "real possibility" and "reasonable suspicion" test concluded that: "Their application by the appellate 
courts … is likely in practice to lead to results which are so similar as to be indistinguishable". In Locabail 
(UK) Ltd v Bayfield Properties Ltd, Locabail (UK) Ltd v Waldorf Investment Corp, Timmins v Gromley, 
Willams v HM Inspector of Taxes, R v Bristol Betting and Gaming Licensing Committee, ex parte 
O'Callaghan  [2000] 1 All ER 65 (hereafter Locabail) the English Court of Appeal concluded that the 
courts would have reached the same conclusion on the use of the two tests by concluding that in an 
overwhelming number of cases the results would be the same. 
8  For Australia, the test is a reasonable apprehension of bias. See the case of Ebner v Official Trustee in 
Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337. For Canada see Mackin v New Brunswick (Minister of Justice); Rice v 
New Brunswick (2002) 209 DLR (4th) 564. For the European Court of Human Rights, see Findlay v United 
Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 221. For Lesotho, see the case of Sekoati v President of the Court Martial 2001 
(7) BCLR 750 (Les CA).  
9  SACCAWU v Irvin & Johnson Ltd 2000 (3) SA 705 (CC). Hereafter SACCAWU 1. 
 is 
a more acceptable interpretation of the reasonable apprehension test than the test laid down in 
SARFU 2 and its interpretation by the majority in SACCAWU 1. More importantly, the cases 
where the tests have been applied will be examined and hopefully it will be shown that there 
are considerable problems and inconsistencies in their application and it will be argued that 
the manifest justice principle provides the proper context for the tests to be properly applied. 
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The tests for actual bias will firstly be considered and then how the two countries approach 
the issue of apparent bias will be examined. This procedure will be followed in order to 
enable a proper understanding of the arguments that will be made in this paper. 
 
2 The test for actual bias 
Actual bias, which is taken to mean a situation where the judicial officer is a party to a case 
or has pecuniary interest in the case, is approached in different ways by the two countries. 
The presence of actual bias in England leads to automatic disqualification of the judicial 
officer. The reverse is the case in South Africa, where there is a conflation of apparent and 
actual bias and allegations of bias are subjected to one and the same test. The situation in 
England will firstly be considered and then the situation in South Africa will be dealt with. 
 
2.1 Actual bias in England 
The overriding public interest principle that there should be confidence in the administration 
of justice is at the heart of the manifest justice principle. In England, this principle operates to 
disqualify a judge automatically when he is a party to or has pecuniary interest in a case. In 
Dimes v Proprietors of the Grand Junction Canal,10
… it is of last importance that the maxim that no man should be a judge in his own 
cause should be held sacred. And that is not to be confined to a cause to which he is 
a party, but applies to a cause in which he has an interest.
 the court stated that: 
11
 In R v Rand
 
12
There is no doubt that any direct pecuniary interest however small, in the subject of 
inquiry, does disqualify a person from acting as a judge in the matter…
 the court also stated that: 
13
                                            
10  Dimes v Proprietors of the Grand Junction Canal (1852) 3 HL Case 759. 
11  At p 793. 
12  R v Rand (1866) LR 1 QB 230. 
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This view is also reiterated in R v Camborne Justices ex parte Pearce14
It is of course clear that any direct pecuniary or proprietary interest in the subject 
matter of proceeding, however small, operates as an automatic disqualification.
 where the court 
stated that: 
15
In Pinochet 2, the House of Lords expanded the category of cases where automatic 
disqualification of a judge would occur from pecuniary to non-pecuniary interests such as 
where the judges' decision would lead to the promotion of a cause in which the judge was 
involved with one of the parties,
 
16
If the absolute impartiality of the judiciary is to be maintained, there must be a rule 
which automatically disqualifies a judge who is involved, whether personally or as a 
director of a company in promoting the same causes in the same organization as is a 
party to a suit.
 thereby dispensing with any inquiry into whether there is 
apparent bias. Lord Browne-Wilkinson said: 
17
I am of the opinion that there could be a case where the interests of the judge in the 
subject matter of the proceedings arising from his strong commitment to some cause 
or belief or his association with a person or body involved in the proceedings could 
shake public confidence in the administration of justice as much as shareholding 
…
 
Lord Hutton also stated that: 
18
In this case, the extradition of the applicant, a former head of state of Chile was sought by the 
government of Spain so that he could be tried for various crimes against humanity allegedly 
committed while he was head of state. A metropolitan stipendiary magistrate issued two 
 
                                                                                                                                       
13  Ibid at p 232. 
14  R v Camborne Justices ex parte Pearce [1954] 2 ALL ER 850 (hereafter Camborne Justices). 
15  Ibid at p 853. In Locabail, the Court of Appeal held after a review of the authorities such as BTR 
Industries South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Metal and Allied Workers Union 1992 (3) SA 673 (A) (hereafter BTR 
Industries); R v Inner West London Coroner, ex parte Dallaglio [1994] 4 All ER 139, 162 (hereafter 
Dallaglio) and Auckland Casino Ltd v Casino Control Authority [1995] 1 NZLR 142, 148 that there is a 
"de minimis exception" provided that the potential effect of any decision on the judge's personal interest is 
so small as to be incapable of affecting his decision one way or the other. This does not seem to represent 
the law especially after Pinochet 2.  
16  The House of Lords held that the long relationship and proximity of the relationship between Amnesty 
International and Lord Hoffman who was a director of Amnesty International Charity was such that he 
was automatically disqualified. It is interesting to note that Lord Hoffman served without remuneration.  
17  N 6 p 588. 
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provisional warrants for his arrest. The applicant successfully applied to the Divisional Court 
to quash those warrants, but the quashing of the second warrant was stayed to enable an 
appeal to the House of Lords on the question of the proper interpretation and scope of the 
immunity of a former head of state from arrest and extradition proceedings in the United 
Kingdom in respect of acts committed whilst a head of state. Amnesty International (AI) was 
granted leave to intervene in the proceedings. The appeal was allowed by a majority of three 
to two and the second warrant was restored. Subsequently the applicant discovered that one 
of the Law Lords in the majority was a director and chairperson of Amnesty International 
Charity Ltd, which had been established to carry out AI's charitable purposes and petitioned 
the House to set its order aside. The significance of Pinochet 2 lies in the willingness of the 
Lords to expand the category of cases where there is no need to inquire into the existence of 
apparent bias on the basis of the manifest justice principle itself needed to maintain public 
confidence in the administration of justice.  
The manifest justice principle operates in the context of the circumstances of the case and 
may even be invoked on the basis of a mere suspicion. In R v Sussex Justices ex parte 
McCarthy19
It is said, and, no doubt, truly, that when the gentlemen retired in the usual way with 
the justices, taking with him the notes of the evidence in case the justices might 
desire to consult him, the justices came to a conclusion without consulting him, and 
that he scrupulously abstained from referring to the case in any way. But while that 
is so, a long line of case shows that it is not merely of some importance but is of 
fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but should be 
manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done. The question therefore is not 
 the applicant came before magistrates charged with the offence of dangerous 
driving, which had involved a collision between his vehicle and another vehicle. The solicitor 
acting as a magistrate's clerk was also acting as solicitor for the other driver in the civil 
proceedings against the applicant arising out of the collision. At the conclusion of evidence 
before the magistrate, the acting clerk retired with them in case his help should be needed on 
a point of law; but in fact the magistrates did not consult him and he himself abstained from 
referring to the case. The court convicted the applicant, but a Divisional Court quashed his 
conviction. Lord Hewart CJ said: 
                                                                                                                                       
18  Ibid at p 597. 
19  N 2. 
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whether in this case, the deputy clerk made any observation or offered any criticism 
which he might not have properly made or offered; the question is whether he was 
so related to the case in its civil aspects as to be unfit to act as a clerk to the justices 
in the criminal matter. The answer to that question depends not upon what actually 
was done but what might appear to be done. Nothing is to be done which creates 
even a suspicion that there has been an improper interference with the course of 
justice …20
As stated above there is no difference between actual and apparent bias in South Africa.
 
 
2.2 Actual bias in South Africa 
21 
While this principle has not been the subject of judicial pronouncement it is implied in cases 
where such interests that would constitute actual bias in England are subjected to the test for 
apparent bias.22  In Rose v Johannesburg Local Road Transportation Board23 a company 
applied for exemption certificates to the Transportation Board which controlled the issuance 
of exemption certificates regulating the commercial operation of self drive car-hire services. 
The chairman of the Board was also a director of three powerful companies, one of which 
was the largest operator of taxis in Johannesburg, opposed to the application which, if 
granted, would not have been to its benefit. The chairman was asked to recuse himself and he 
refused to do so. On review the court held that a reasonable man would apprehend that the 
chairman was biased. In Parag v Ladysmith City Council24
                                            
20  Ibid at p 233-234. This dictum has been quoted with approval by South African Courts: Liebenberg v 
Brakpan Liquor Licensing Board 1944 WLD 52 at 55; S v Radebe 1973 (1) SA 796 (A) at 811; Magqabi v 
Mafundityala (1979) 4 SA 106 (E) at 110; S v Herbst 1980 (3) SA 1026 (T) at 1029; S v Louw, S v Noyila 
1981 (4) SA 939 (E) at 940. 
21  This is also the position in Australia where the High Court in Ebner v The Official Trustee in Bankruptcy 
[2000] HCA 63, par 33-34: "The common law in both England and Australia in relation to this subject has 
come a long way since the middle of the nineteenth century. In Australia, the common law has developed 
along lines somewhat different from the development in England. In this country, an issue such as that 
which arose in Pinochet (No. 2) would be resolved by asking whether a fair-minded lay observer might 
reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question the 
judge was required to decide. That is the test to be applied in the present appeals. And it reflects the 
general principle which is to be applied to the problems of apprehended bias, whether arising from 
interest, conduct, association, extraneous information, or some other circumstance." 
22  See Baxter Administrative Law 562 who said: "… the courts have always accepted that whenever a 
decision-maker has a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the decision, there is a reasonable apprehension 
of real likelihood of bias". 
23  Rose v Johannesburg Local Road Transportation Board 1947 (4) SA 272 (W). 
24  Parag v Ladysmith City Council 1961 (3) SA 714 (N).  
 members of a licensing appeal 
committee who were holders of a general dealers' licence were disqualified because their 
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membership led to an apprehension of bias. In Peri-Urban Areas Health Board v 
Administrator Transvaal25 the membership of a commission of inquiry to determine the 
extension of municipal boundaries by an engineer who was also a member of a firm of 
consulting engineers, was held to have created an apprehension of bias because of the fact 
that his firm stood to benefit from the extension of the municipal boundaries. Accordingly, 
the member was ordered by the court to recuse himself. The facts of Liebenberg v Brakpan 
Liquor Licensing Board26 are that the mayor of a municipality sat on the local liquor 
licensing board when it heard competing applications including one from the mayor's brother 
for a liquor licence. The licence was granted to the mayor's brother. The court held that the 
blood relationship was enough to create a likelihood of bias. The involvement of the wife of 
a judicial officer has been held to create an apprehension of bias. In S v Bam27 the wife of the 
magistrate was a witness of the State while in S v Sharp,28 the wife of the magistrate was 
involved in the arrest of the accused person and gave evidence. In Bam-Mugwanya v 
Minister of Finance and Provincial Expenditure, Eastern Cape29
                                            
25  Peri-Urban Areas Health Board v Administrator Transvaal 1961 (3) SA 669 (T). 
26  1944 WLD 52. 
27  S v Bam 1972 (4) SA 41 (E). 
28  S v Sharp [2002] JOL 9320 (Ck). 
29  Bam-Mugwanya v Minister of Finance and Provincial Expenditure, Eastern Cape 2001 4 (SA) 120 (Ck). 
 the removal of a member of 
a tenders board was upheld because of her financial interests in a passenger service whose 
contract was being considered for extension by her board. This level of personal interest was 
held to be sufficient to necessitate her recusal.  
The position in South Africa is such that it may not be difficult for the courts to recognise a 
category of automatic disqualification. Even if they do not in a formal sense, it is important 
that the public policy consideration of maintaining the confidence of the public in the 
administration of justice is at the heart of the test for judicial bias. Pinochet 2 can be said to 
have rekindled the manifest justice principle given that the court expanded the automatic 
disqualification rule to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice. It is this 
need to sustain the confidence of the public that drives the analysis below. The test for 
apparent bias in England follows. 
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3 The tests for apparent bias 
3.1 The real possibility test in England 
For a long time English courts applied two tests in determining the presence of bias on the 
part of a judicial officer. The first test was the "real likelihood" or "real danger" of bias. In R 
v Barnsley County Borough Licensing Justices, ex parte Barnsley and District Licensed 
Victualler' Association,30
We have not to inquire what impression might be left on the minds of the present 
applicants or on the minds of the public generally. We have to satisfy ourselves that 
there was a real likelihood of bias: not merely satisfy ourselves that that was the sort 
of impression that might reasonably get abroad.
 Lord Devlin stated that: 
31
The second test is the reasonable apprehension or suspicion test. In Metropolitan Properties 
Co (FGC) Ltd v Lannon,
  
32
In considering whether there was a real likelihood of bias the court does not … look 
to see if for extension there was a real likelihood that he would or did in fact favour 
one side at the expense of the other. The court looks at the impression which would 
be given to other people … the reason is plain enough. Justice must be rooted in 
confidence: and confidence is destroyed when right-minded people go away 
thinking: 'The judge was biased'.
 Lord Denning set out the test thus: 
33
I think it unnecessary, in formulating the appropriate test, to require that the court 
should look at the matter through the eyes of a reasonable man, because the court in 
cases such as these personifies the reasonable man; and in any event the court has 
first to ascertain the relevant circumstances from the available evidence, knowledge 
of which would not readily be available to the observer in court at the relevant time. 
Finally, for the avoidance of doubt, I prefer to state the test in terms of real danger 
 
In Gough the House of Lords adopted the "real danger/likelihood test". Lord Goff of 
Chieveley formulated the test thus: 
                                            
30  R v Barnsley County Borough Licensing Justices, ex parte Barnsley and District Licensed Victualler' 
Association [1960] 2 QB 167 (hereafter Barnsley Justices). 
31  At pp 186-187. See also R v Box [1964] 1 QB 340; R v Sawyer (1980) 71 Cr App R 283; and R v Spencer 
[1987] AC 128. 
32  Metropolitan Properties v Lannon [1969] 1 QB 577 (hereafter Metropolitan Properties). 
33  At p 599. Cf Sussex Justices [1924] 1 KB 256; R v Liverpool City Justices, ex parte Topping [1983] 1 All 
ER 490; and R v Mulvihill [1990] 1 All ER 436. 
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rather than probability of bias. Accordingly, having ascertained the relevant 
circumstances the court should ask itself whether, having regard to those 
circumstances, there was a real danger of bias on the part of the relevant member of 
the tribunal in question, in the sense that he might unfairly regard (or have unfairly 
regard) with favour, or disfavour, the case of a party to the issue under consideration 
by him …34
[…] warrant for quashing convictions or invalidating orders upon quite 
unsubstantial grounds and indeed, in some cases, upon the flimsiest pretext of 
bias.
 
The test in Gough was a reaction to the trend in English law which sought to base the test of 
apparent bias on "mere suspicion". Thus in Camborne Justices, the court attacked the "mere 
suspicion" test declaring it as a 
35
[…] inquire what impression might be left in the minds of the present applicants or 
on the minds of the public generally.
 
In Barnsley Justices, Devlin LJ stressed the need to abandon the "mere suspicion" test when 
he stated that in assessing the allegation of bias, the court should not  
36
In Locabail, the Court of Appeal sought to elaborate on the content of the test of real 
danger/likelihood of bias.
  
Lord Goff in Gough alluded to the reliance on "mere suspicion" as the basis of the test for 
bias as being the effect of the decision in the Sussex Justices case. 
37
It would be dangerous to list the factors which may or may not give rise to a real 
danger of bias. Everything will depend on the facts, which may include the nature of 
the issue to be decided. We cannot conceive of circumstances in which the objection 
could be soundly based on religion, ethnic or national origin, gender, age, class, 
 In the court's opinion: 
                                            
34  See n 6 above at p 670. 
35  N 14 above at p 855. 
36  N 30 above at p 714-715. 
37  This case is a judgment on five cases, which were applications for permission to appeal and they touched 
on a common question concerning the disqualification of judges on grounds of bias. See n 7 above. Cf 
Malleson 2000 Modern Law Review 119. The author believes that this case is a reaction to the uncertainty 
that trailed the decision in Gough. Reference is made to the dictum of Lord Woolf in Gough at p 740: "The 
court should hesitate long before creating any other special category since this will immediately create 
uncertainty as to what are the parameters of that category and what is the test to be applied in that case of 
that category". 
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means or sexual orientation of the judge. Nor, at any rate ordinarily could an 
objection be soundly based on the judge's social or educational or service or 
employment background or history, nor that of any member of the judge's family; or 
previous political associations; or membership of social or sporting or charitable 
bodies; or Masonic associations; or previous judicial decisions; or extra-curricular 
utterances (whether in textbooks, lectures, speeches, articles, interviews, reports or 
responses to consultation papers); or previous receipt of instructions to act for or 
against any party, solicitor or advocate engaged in a case before him; or 
membership of the same inn, circuit, local law society or chambers … by contrast, a 
real danger of bias might well be thought to arise if there were personal friendship 
or animosity between the judge and any member of public involved in the case or if 
the judge were closely acquainted with any member of the public involved in the 
case, particularly if the credibility of that individual could be significant in the 
decision of the case; or if, in a case where the credibility of any individual were an 
issue to be decided by the judge, he had in a previous case rejected the evidence of 
that person in such outspoken terms as to throw doubt on his ability to approach 
such person's evidence with an open mind on any later occasion; or if on any 
question at issue before him the judge had expressed, particularly in the course of 
the hearing, in such extreme and unbalanced terms as to throw doubt on his ability 
to try the issue with an objective judicial mind … or if, for any other reason, there 
was real ground for doubting the ability of the judge to ignore extraneous 
considerations, prejudices and predilections and bring an objective judgment to bear 
on the issues before him. The mere fact that a judge, earlier in the same case or in a 
previous case, had commented adversely on a party or witness or found the evidence 
of a party or witness to be unreliable, would not without more found a sustainable 
objection … We repeat: every application must be decided on the facts and 
circumstances of the individual case. The greater the passage of time between the 
event relied on as showing a danger of bias and the case in which the objection is 
raised, the weaker (other things being equal) the objection would be.38
In two of the cases that make up Locabail: Locabail (UK) Ltd v Bayfield Properties Ltd and 
Locabail (UK) Ltd v Waldorf Investment Corporation, the court in applying the real danger 
test declined to accept that the discovery of a conflict of interest, which under the Law 
Society's conflict rules, would disqualify a solicitor from acting for one or the other of the 
parties to a case necessarily bars the solicitor from hearing the case as a deputy judge or 
requires a hearing already started to be aborted or a judgment given on the case to be set 
aside. Everything, the court argued, depended on the circumstances of the case. The fact that 
the solicitor had only known of the involvement of his firm in the course of the trial and had 
made this known to the parties the next day and the declaration that he knew nothing of his 
firm's involvement was instrumental. The court seemed unduly influenced by the question of 
  
                                            
38  At p 78. 
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actual bias. That can be the only explanation for the reliance it placed on the solicitor's 
declaration of lack of knowledge of the matter his firm was handling and the fact that given 
the large size of the firm – 145 solicitors and over 300 assistant solicitors – the solicitor was 
telling the truth. With due respect, the court misapplied the rule in Gough. The court should 
not have laboured to assess proof of actual bias. It should have determined what a reasonable 
onlooker objectively viewing the proceedings would feel about the solicitor whose 
professional association would not approve of his representing one of the parties sitting in 
judgment over the parties. In Timmins v Gormley, the allegation of apparent bias was the 
intellectual bent of the judge. It was alleged that at the time of the judgment, the recorder 
could have been influenced by an unconscious or settled prejudice against the insurers of the 
party alleging bias as a result of this perspective. In support of this, a number of articles of 
the recorder were referred to. Furthermore, it was alleged that the findings of the recorder 
were favourable to the claimants and were evidence of the bias. The court held that taking a 
broad common sense approach, a person holding pronounced pro-claimant anti-insurer views 
expressed by the recorder in the articles, might unconsciously have weighed in favour of the 
claimant and against the defendant in resolving the factual issues before them and that there 
was a real danger of bias. The fact that the recorder had disclosed his affiliation to a pro 
claimant association did nothing to impress the court. The court acknowledged that there was 
a long established tradition that the writing of books or the editing of textbooks is not 
incompatible with holding judicial office. However, such judicial officer should: 
[…] exercise considerable care not to express himself in terms which indicate that 
he has preconceived views which are so firmly held that it may not be possible for 
him to try a case with an open mind.39
The fourth case in Locabail is Williams v Inspector of Taxes,
  
In this opinion the court was correct in its assessment that it was not the actual bias of the 
recorder that was important. Rather it was the fact that a reasonable person aware of the 
recorder's intellectual activity would conclude that there was a real likelihood that he will be 
biased.  
40 where the court declined to 
find bias in the fact that the chairman of a tribunal who had sat over a complaint of sexual 
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harassment and race discrimination levelled against the Internal Revenue, had been employed 
a long time before the hearing in a junior position in the internal revenue. In the last case, R v 
Bristol Betting and Gaming Licensing Committee, ex parte O'Callaghan,41
The change of the "reasonable suspicion" test was heralded in In re Medicaments and 
Related Classes of Goods (No. 2),
 the court declined 
to grant the permission to appeal on the grounds that the non-executive directorship of a 
judge in a company owning properties which were rented by a party in a case before him and 
of which he claimed he knew nothing, did not raise a real likelihood of bias. It is submitted 
that the court was right in its application of the test in Williams, while in Bristol Betting, it 
sought proof of actual bias and relied on the fact that the judge was a non-executive director 
and the truth of his assertion that he did not know that they were tenants of his company. 
Again it is likely that a fair-minded observer who knows that the party is a tenant of the 
judge's company will feel that there is a danger/likelihood of bias, even with the assertion of 
the judge that he did not know of the tenancy. 
42 where the Court of Appeal acknowledged that the test 
formulated in Gough had not commanded universal approval43 and did not seem in tune with 
the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg44
When the Strasbourg jurisprudence is taken into account, we believe that a modest 
adjustment of the test in R v Gough is called for, which makes it plain that it is in 
effect, no different from the test applied in most of the Commonwealth and 
Scotland. The Court must first ascertain all the circumstances which have a bearing 
on the suggestion that the judge was biased. It must then ask whether those 
circumstances would lead a fair-minded and informed observer to conclude that 
there was a real possibility or a real danger, the two being the same, that the tribunal 
was biased.
 and that there was, 
therefore, a basis for review. Accordingly, the court conducted a review and stated that: 
45
                                                                                                                                       
39  Ibid at p 91. 
40  Hereafter Williams. 
41  Hereafter Bristol Betting. 
42  In re Medicaments and Related Classes of Goods (No. 2) [2001] 1 WLR 700. 
43  The decision was criticised or not followed in many commonwealth countries. In Australia, see Webb v R 
(1994) 181 CLR 41. In South Africa: R v Roberts 1999 (4) SA 915 (SCA) (hereafter Roberts). In Scotland 
see Bradford v McLeod 1986 SLT 244; Millar v Dickson 2001 SLT 988. Cf Lord Browne-Wilkinson in 
Pinochet 2 (n 6 above at p 598).  
44  See Piersack v Belgium (1982) 5 EHRR 169; De Cubber v Belgium (1984) 7 EHRR 236; Pullar v UK 
(1996) 22 EHRR 391; and Hautschildt v Denmark (1989) 12 EHRR 266. 
45  N 42 at p 726-727. 
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In Porter the House of Lords adopted this formulation of the test with the deletion of the 
phrase "real danger" and summarised the rule thus:  
The question is whether the fair-minded and informed observer, having considered 
the facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility that the tribunal was 
biased.46
In Taylor v Lawrence,
 
It is clear that the "modest change" effected by the court was, by the addition of the phrase 
"fair-minded and informed observer", to give the impression that it is the view of the 
observer and not the court, approved by Gough that is relevant. What is apparent from the 
consideration of the cases below is that the court undertakes the analysis of the "fair-minded 
and informed person". 
The application of the real possibility test will now be considered. In Porter the allegation 
was that the auditor, who was involved in the assessment of whether political considerations 
had beclouded the implementation of a housing policy, gave a press conference where he 
made remarks on his provisional findings. The Court held that the main impression that 
would have been conveyed to a fair-minded observer was that the purpose of the press 
conference was to attract publicity to the auditor and that was an exercise in self-promotion 
that should not have been engaged in. The press conference was not indicative of bias, 
because in the context of the investigation he was carrying out and in his subsequent 
behaviour, there was no real possibility of bias. The court was quick to discountenance the 
personal assurances of the auditor that he was not biased and viewed the matter holistically. 
47
                                            
46  N 6 at p 507. 
47  Taylor v Lawrence [2002] 2 ALL ER 353 (hereafter Taylor). 
 the judge presiding over a boundary dispute informed the parties that 
he had been a client of the claimant's solicitors but that it had been many years since he had 
instructed them. Nobody objected to his continuing to hear the trial. After judgment was 
given for the claimants, the defendants appealed on the grounds, inter alia, that there was an 
appearance of bias because of the judge's relationship with the claimant's solicitors. Before 
the hearing of the appeal, it was disclosed to the defendants that the judge and his wife had 
used the solicitor's services to change his will a night before the judgment was given. The 
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appeal was dismissed and subsequently the defendants learned that the judge had not paid for 
the services. The defendants applied to reopen the appeal on the grounds that the judge had 
received financial benefit from the solicitors, which it had failed to disclose and that the 
earlier appeal had been dismissed in ignorance of that fact. The issue before the court was 
whether having also disclosed that the solicitors held the will, his failure to disclose also that 
the solicitors were currently instructed in relation to it gave rise to a fear in a fair-minded and 
informed observer of a real possibility that the judge's judgment would be influenced by that 
current relationship. The Court of Appeal held that for purposes of applying the test of 
apparent bias, the informed observer could be expected to be aware of the legal traditions and 
culture of the English jurisdiction and accordingly, he would be aware that contacts between 
the judiciary and the legal profession should not be regarded as giving rise to a possibility of 
bias. On the contrary, they promoted an atmosphere that was totally inimical of bias and what 
was true of social relationships was equally true of normal professional relationships between 
a judge and the lawyers he might instruct in a private capacity. It is argued that the facts of 
this case and its application by the court also illustrate the fact the real possibility test is all 
about a court personifying the reasonable man and assessing the evidence. The court clearly 
raised a presumption that was attributable to a reasonable man as a basic foundation of his 
perception. In any case, it seems a little difficult to believe that there is no real possibility of 
bias when a judge in a matter makes a partial disclosure and proceeds to meet the solicitors 
of a party before him, without the presence of the other party or his solicitor. It is submitted 
that this is one case where a real possibility of bias existed. 
After Taylor, the case of Lawal v Northern Spirit,48 demonstrates the return of English 
Courts in the application of the Porter test to the manifest justice principle as it dealt with the 
issue of subconscious bias49
                                            
48  Lawal v Northern Spirit Ltd [2004] 1 ALL ER 187 (hereafter Lawal). 
49  In Gough (n 6 above at p 728) Lord Goff said: "… bias is such an insidious thing that even though a 
person may in good faith believe that he was acting impartially, his mind may unconsciously be affected 
by bias".  
 arising from a relationship of trust and confidence. The standard 
after Lawal is a lower threshold that judicial officers and administrators must pass to be 
regarded as impartial and is justified by the court on the modest shift by the House of Lords 
in Porter, based on the need to maintain public confidence in the judiciary. The facts of 
Lawal are that in the course of an appeal to the Employment Appeal Tribunal, the senior 
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counsel instructed by the employer had previously sat as a part-time judge (a recorder)50
The Recorder objection amounts to no more than an assertion that a lay member 
might possibly be more disposed to accept the submissions of one party's legal 
representative than those of other side, as a result of the professional experience of 
having sat on the tribunal with him in his capacity as a part time judge. That is 
merely a speculative and remote possibility based on an unfounded and, some might 
think, condescending assumption that a lay member sitting with another judge on 
the hearing of an appeal cannot tell the difference between the impartial decision-
making role played by a tribunal panel of a judge and two lay members and the 
adversarial role of the partisan advocates appearing for the parties.
 with 
one of the lay members of the Appeal Tribunal. The claimant raised an objection that there 
was a real possibility of subconscious bias on the part of the lay member. Without ruling on 
that objection, the tribunal ordered that the appeal should be heard by a differently 
constituted tribunal, but considered the point on principle and held that there was no real 
possibility of bias when the only objection against the Employment Appeal Tribunal was that 
either one or both of the lay members had previously sat with a recorder who, as counsel, 
was appearing for a party at the appeal. The majority of the Court of Appeal affirmed the 
decision of the Appeal Tribunal hence the appeal to the House of Lords. However, the court 
was not unanimous. Mummery LJ who was with the majority said:  
51
The fair minded and informed lay observer will readily perceive, I have no doubt, 
the collegial spirit in which the Appeal Tribunal operates and the degree of trust 
which lay members repose on the presiding judge. It is my judgment likely to 
diminish public confidence in the administration of justice if a judge who enjoys 
that relationship with lay members, with the degree of reliance placed on his view of 
the law, subsequently appears before them as an advocate. The fair minded observer 
might well reasonably perceive that the litigant opposed by an advocate who is a 
 
Lord Phillips mr, who was also with the majority, stressed the fact that the frequency of the 
recorder's sitting would determine the issue of the appearance of bias such that the more the 
recorder sat, the greater the likelihood that he would appear to the litigant as a judge of the 
tribunal rather than an advocate that sometimes sits as a judge. In his dissenting opinion Pill 
LJ stated that: 
                                            
50  The practice before this case was that the Lord Chancellor would appoint leading counsel who are 
recorders and experienced in employment law to sit as part time judges in the Employment Appeal 
Tribunal and they undertake to sit for at least 20 days a year. They were also allowed to appear before the 
tribunals of which they were part time members. 
51  See n 48 above loc cit par 8.  
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member of the tribunal and has sat with the lay members is at a disadvantage as a 
result of that association. A litigant's doubt about that impartiality … would, for the 
reasons given, be a legitimate doubt. In my view, the procedure does not inspire 
public confidence.52
The House of Lords agreed with the minority opinion. The court, in accordance with the test 
in Porter, held that the practice whereby part time judges in the Employment Appeal 
Tribunal might appear as counsel before a tribunal, having previously sat with one or more 
lay members of the bench hearing the appeal should be discontinued, as a fair-minded and 
informed observer, having considered the given facts, would conclude that there was a real 
possibility that the lay member might be subconsciously biased. The court believed that the 
observer was likely to approach the matter on the basis that the lay member looked to the 
judge for guidance on the law and could be expected to develop a fairly close relationship of 
trust and confidence with the judge. The Lords in a manner attributed constructive notice of 
two facts to the "fair-minded and informed lay observer". The first fact was that a recorder in 
a criminal case who had sat with jurors might not subsequently appear in a case in which one 
or more of the jurors served,
 
53 while the second fact is that part-time chairmen of 
employment tribunals are prohibited from appearing as counsel before the tribunals of which 
they have acted as chairman.54
The indispensable requirement of public confidence in the administration of justice 
requires higher standards today than was the case even a decade or two ago. The 
informed observer of today can perhaps 'be expected to be aware of the legal 
traditions and culture of this jurisdiction' as was said in Taylor v Lawrence … But 
he may not be wholly uncritical of this culture.
 The Lords seemed ready to move beyond convention and 
practice since they rejected the argument that the practice of part time judges appearing 
before the tribunal had been going on for some time, an argument that would have been 
consistent with the attitude of the Court of Appeal in Taylor. Thus Lord Steyn stated that: 
55
Lawal is certainly a shift noticeable from Pinochet 2 of the readiness of the English judiciary 
to more readily find bias, a position which is entirely consistent with the manifest justice 
principle. There is no doubt that the effect of a lower threshold on later cases will be 
 
                                            
52  Ibid par 9. 
53  See par 30 of the Policy Procedure and Terms and Conditions of Service of Recorders. 
54  See par 16 of the Terms and Conditions of Service and Terms of Appointment of Part-Time Chairmen of 
Employment Tribunals. 
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pervasive and that will be welcome. A discussion of the two tests, which have been used in 
South Africa, follows. 
3.2 The reasonable suspicion test in South Africa 
The "reasonable suspicion" test for apparent bias was laid down in the case of BTR Industries 
South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Metal and Allied Workers Union.56
… in our law the existence of a reasonable suspicion of bias satisfies the test; and 
that an apprehension of a real likelihood that the decision maker will be biased is 
not a prerequisite for disqualifying bias. The test is that of a 'reasonable suspicion'.
 In this case, the Appellate 
Division stated that: 
57
This case is a clear case of a reasonable suspicion of bias because in the course of a long-
drawn case between labour and management, the President of the Industrial Court 
participated in a seminar arranged by management's industrial relations consultants in which 
management's lawyers all presented papers. In Roberts,
  
58
The requirements of the test for the appearance of judicial bias are as follows as 
applied to judicial proceedings: (1) There must be a suspicion that the judicial 
officer might, not would, be biased. (2) The suspicion must be that of a reasonable 
person in the position of the accused or the litigant. (3) The suspicion must be based 
on reasonable grounds. (4) The suspicion is one which the reasonable person 
referred to would, not might, have.
 the Supreme Court of Appeal 
clarified this test. Howie JA said: 
59
…if the suspicion of bias is one based on reasonable grounds the reasonable person 
would have it. If it were not so founded the reasonable person would not have it.
 
The court was quick to emphasise that: 
60
                                                                                                                                       
55  See n 47 above at par 22. 
56  See n 15 above. 
57  At p 693. Cf Council of Review, SADF v Monning 1992 (3) SA 482 (A) (hereafter Monning); Moch v 
Nedtravel 1996 (3) SA 1 (A) (hereafter Moch); De Lille v Speaker of the National Assembly 1998 (3) SA 
340(C); Ighayiya Technical College v Member of the Executive Council for Education, Eastern Cape 1998 
(4) SA 502 (Ck). 
58  See n 43 above. 
59  Ibid at p 924. 
60  Ibid at p 925. Emphasis original.  
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The reasonable suspicion test became entrenched in the decision of the English Court of 
Appeal in Metropolitan Properties which was given nine years after Barnsley Justices 
elaborated the real likelihood of bias test. It is the opinion that this test too sought to move 
away from the "mere suspicion" test, even though there are dicta in the judgment that the 
court in Metropolitan Properties was following the Sussex Justices formulation of Lord 
Hewart CJ.61
Whereas Devlin LJ spoke of the impression which the court gets from the 
circumstances, Lord Denning mr looked at the circumstances from the point of view 
of a reasonable man … Since however the court investigates the actual 
circumstances, knowledge of such circumstances as are found by the court must be 
imputed to the reasonable man; and in the result it is difficult to see what difference 
there is between the impression derived by a reasonable man to whom such 
knowledge has been imputed and the impression derived by the court, here 
personifying the reasonable man.
 
The use of the word "reasonable" imports some subjectivity, which, in turn, contemplates a 
discretion and relies on the views of the proverbial reasonable man which is quite often 
nothing more than the views of the court. Lord Goff recognised this point in Gough when he 
argued that a comparison of the opinion of Denning mr in Metropolitan Properties and that 
of Devlin LJ in Barnsley Justices shows that there was no significant difference between the 
real likelihood of bias test and the real danger test except that:  
62
With the greatest respect I venture to say that there is an important distinction 
between assessing the appearance of bias through the eyes of a trained and 
experienced judicial officer and assessing it through the eyes of a reasonable person 
even with the latter possessing all the relevant knowledge … Certainly, in 
eliminating the reasonable observer the real danger test is more direct and no doubt 
the reasonable man although required to have reasonable grounds, would 
 
The element that Howie JA added in Roberts – that the suspicion is one which a reasonable 
person would, not might, have – further confirms the shift away from the "mere suspicion" 
test and demonstrates the discretion given to the court to determine what suspicion a 
reasonable person would have. In a penetrating analysis of the difference between the "real 
likelihood/danger test" and "reasonable suspicion" test, Howie JA stated that: 
                                            
61  See n 32 above. Cf Lord Denning MR at p 309-310 and Edmund Davies LJ at p 314. 
62  See n 6 above at p 735. 
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necessarily be judged as viewing the events and circumstances from the subjectivity 
of being, notionally, litigant or accused. However the real danger test may well do 
no more than switch one element of subjectivity for another. The members of the 
court applying that test are by training and experience as judicial officers 
themselves, better equipped, it is true, to exercise objective judgment than a lay 
litigant but it is that very training and experience which gives them a subjective 
position and knowledge not possessed by the notional reasonable person. They 
might know that a judicial officer's behaviour and comment unfortunately can, on 
infrequent occasions, be in appropriate but without any real danger of bias as not 
real where the reasonable impression of bias would nonetheless reasonably lodge in 
the mind of a reasonable person suitably informed …63
In SARFU 2 the Constitutional Court of South Africa adopted the reasonable apprehension 
test
 
It is our submission that the same argument can be made as to the reasonable man who, based 
on certain assumptions, would hold that no bias appears while members of the public who 
depend on "mere suspicion" would feel that there is an appearance of bias. Be that as it may, 
it seems unlikely for a court to assess bias from a reasonable man's point of view without 
interposing its judicial training. This point will be returned to later. 
3.3 The reasonable apprehension test in South Africa 
64
It follows from the foregoing that the correct approach to this application for the 
recusal of members of this court is objective and the onus of establishing it rests 
upon the applicant. The question is whether a reasonable, objective and informed 
person would on the correct facts reasonably apprehend that the judge has not or 
will not bring an impartial mind to bear on the adjudication of the case that is a 
mind open to persuasion by evidence and the submissions of counsel. The 
reasonableness of the apprehension must be assessed in the light of the oath of 
office taken by the Judges to administer justice without fear or favour; and their 
ability to carry out that oath by reason of their training and experience. It must be 
assumed that they can disabuse their minds of any irrelevant personal beliefs or 
predispositions. They must take into account the fact they have a duty to sit in any 
case which they are not obliged to recuse themselves. At the same time it must 
never be forgotten that an impartial Judge is a fundamental prerequisite for a fair 
 and laid down the proper approach to the application of recusal of members of a court. 
The court stated that: 
                                            
63  Par 36.  
64  This test has been adopted in Lesotho: Sole v Cullinan [2003] 3 All SA 466 (Les CA). For an analysis of 
this case see Okpaluba 2004 TLR 1. It has also been followed in Swaziland. See Minister of Justice v 
Sapire (civ App 49/2001, 10.6.02 unrep). 
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trial and a judicial officer should not hesitate to recuse herself or himself if there are 
reasonable grounds on the part of litigant for apprehending that the judicial officer, 
for whatever reasons, was not or will not be impartial.65
The distinguishing feature of the reasonable apprehension test in SARFU 2 is the 
presumption of judicial impartiality.
  
66 An examination of the cases of S v Malindi,67 
Monning,68 BTR industries and Roberts will show that in none of the cases the presumption 
of judicial impartiality was used. SARFU 2 introduced it and it radically altered the 
reasonable suspicion test that it may be safe to regard the correct test in South Africa now to 
be the "reasonable apprehension" test. Mithiyane AJA in Sager v Smith69 argued that the use 
of "apprehension" instead of "suspicion" is a difference in terminology, which has no 
significance.70 With due respect it does seem that it has significance. Apart from the fact that 
apprehension is a more appropriate term for the objective test laid down in SARFU 2, 
suspicion connotes a subjective state of mind. As stated above, the presumption of judicial 
impartiality represents the change to the test as laid down in BTR Industries and amplified in 
Roberts. That a new test71
In formulating the test the Court observed that two considerations are built into the 
test itself. The first is that in considering the application for recusal, the court as a 
starting point presumes that judicial officers are impartial in adjudicating disputes. 
As later emerges from the SARFU judgment, this in-built aspect entails two further 
consequences. On one hand, it is the applicant for recusal who bears the onus of 
 is introduced by SARFU 2 is evident in SACCAWU 1, where the 
Constitutional Court in a majority judgment further explained the test.  In the opinion of the 
court: 
                                            
65  Ibid at par 48. The court relied on the decision of the Canadian Supreme Court in R v S (RD (1997) 118 
CCC (3d) 353. 
66  On the presumption of judicial impartiality the Constitutional Court cited with approval, the dictum of 
Cory j in R v S (RD) ibid at par 117: "Courts have rightly recognized that there is a presumption that 
judges will carry out their oath of office … This is one of the reasons why the threshold for a successful 
allegation of perceived judicial bias is high. However, despite this high threshold, the presumption can be 
displaced with 'cogent evidence' that demonstrates that something the judge has done gives rise to a 
reasonable apprehension of bias". 
67  S v Malindi 1990 (1) SA 962 (A): The matter must be regarded from the point of view of the reasonable 
litigant and the test is an objective one. The fact that in reality the judicial officer was impartial or likely to 
be impartial is not the test. It is the reasonable perception of the parties as to his impartiality that is 
important" at p 969(H). 
68  See n 57 above at p 880(E-F): "the appearance of impartiality has to do with the public perception of the 
administration of justice." 
69  Sager v Smith 2001 (3) SA 1004 (SCA) par 15: "The difference would appear to be one of semantics 
rather than substance." 
70  Cf Hoexter, Lyster and Currie Constitutional and Administrative Law 192 and Devenish 2000 TSAR 397. 
71  See Okpaluba 2003 JJS 109.  
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rebutting the presumption of judicial impartiality. On the other hand, the 
presumption is not easily dislodged. It requires 'cogent' or 'convincing' evidence to 
be rebutted. The second in-built aspect of the test is that 'absolute neutrality' is 
something of a chimera in the judicial context. This is because judges are human. 
They are unavoidably the product of their own life experiences, and the perspective 
thus derived inevitably and distinctively informs each judge's performance of his or 
her judicial duties. But colourless neutrality stands in contrast to judicial impartiality 
- a distinction the SARFU decision vividly illustrates. Impartiality is that quality of 
open-minded readiness to persuasion-without unfitting adherence to either party, or 
to the judge's own predilections, preconceptions and personal views - that of a 
civilized system of adjudication. Impartiality requires in short a mind open to 
persuasion by the evidence and the submissions of counsel; and in contrast to 
neutrality, this is an absolute requirement in every judicial proceeding … The court 
in SARFU further alluded to the apparently double requirement of reasonableness 
that the application of the test imports. Not only must the person apprehending bias 
must be a reasonable person, but the apprehension must in the circumstances be 
reasonable … The 'double' unreasonableness requirement also highlights the fact 
that mere apprehensiveness on the part of the litigant that a judge will be biased - 
even a strongly and honestly felt anxiety - is not enough. The court must carefully 
scrutinize the apprehension to determine whether it is to be regarded as reasonable. 
In adjudging this, the court superimposes a normative assessment on the litigant's 
anxieties. It attributes to the litigant's apprehension a legal value, and thereby 
decides whether it is such that should be countenanced by law.72
The court went further to state that determining the objective legal value in South Africa 
involves "fraught considerations … because the administration of justice", emerging as it has 
from "the evils and immorality of the old order", remains vulnerable to attacks on its 
legitimacy and integrity.
 
73
On one hand, it is vital to the integrity of our courts and the independence of judges 
and magistrates that ill-founded and misdirected challenges to the composition of a 
bench be discouraged. On the other, the courts' very vulnerability serves to 
underscore the pre-eminent value to be placed on public confidence in impartial 
adjudication. In striking the correct balance, it is 'as wrong to yield to a tenuous or 
frivolous objection' as it is 'to ignore an objection of substance'.
 In the court's opinion, two factors must be borne in mind in 
determining this legal value: 
74
It is the determination of this objective legal value that is fraught with grave danger. Again, 
as stated above, the court personifies the reasonable man in doing so and often requires proof 
 
                                            
72  N 9, par 15-18. Cf Sager v Smith at n 69. 
73  Ibid par 18. 
74  Ibid. 
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of the bias as establishing the legal value. As Smith-Brown LJ stated in Dallaglio (in a 
dictum approved by Howie JA in Roberts): 
It will be seen therefore that by the time the legal challenge comes to be resolved, 
the court is no longer concerned strictly with the appearance of bias but rather with 
establishing the possibility that there was actual although unconscious bias.75
The test for recusal places a heavy burden of persuasion on the person alleging 
judicial bias or its appearance. But despite the presumption in favour of judges' 
impartiality, the test requires an assessment of the litigant's perception of 
impartiality …. A judge called upon to decide whether or not a disqualifying 
apprehension of bias exists, however should consider the apprehension of the lay 
litigant alleging bias and the reasonableness of that apprehension based on the actual 
circumstances of the case. As Cameron AJ points out, the lay litigant is assumed to 
be well-informed and equipped with the correct facts. But the lay litigant should not 
be expected to have the understanding of a trained lawyer and to appreciate the 
implications of the different nature of the appeal process. In both cases it will be the 
judges who decide and who must have an open mind. In all circumstances, the test 
emphasizes reasonableness in the light of the true facts, not the technical nuances of 
the particular case. It is our contention that the reasonableness of the apprehension 
also requires that the judge assess the lay litigant in her or his context.
  
It is, therefore, apparent that where there is no proof, the legal value will not be met. This 
manner of proceeding is far from assessing an apprehension of bias, even if it is consistent 
with the introduction of a reasonable apprehension test.  
The dissenting opinion of Mokgoro and Sachs jj in SACCAWU 1 put the author's argument in 
proper perspective: 
76
The contending views in SACCAWU 1 led to different assessments of the allegation of bias. 
When the applicant's appeal against the industrial court's refusal to grant them unfair labour 
practice relief was called in the Labour Appeal Court, they moved for the recusal of two of 
the three judges on the grounds that they reasonably apprehended bias against their appeal. 
 
It is submitted that the minority opinion accords with the reasonable suspicion test laid down 
in BTR Industries and Roberts. 
                                            
75  N 15 at p 152. 
76  N 9 par 56-58. 
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The application was refused hence the appeal. Thirty-five applicants were dismissed on 2 
August 1995 for participation in a demonstration in the respondent's factory on 21 June 
1995.77 Consequent to the dismissal the union representing the applicants organised a 
demonstration protesting the dismissal between 25 and 31 August 1995. Another thirty-five 
employees were consequently dismissed of which seventeen were under final written 
warning for participating in the 21 June march.78 The two groups of employees brought 
separate proceedings for unfair labour practice relief in the industrial court. The first to reach 
trial were the Nomoyi employees. The industrial court confirmed the dismissal of the 
seventeen under final written warning but reinstated the remaining eighteen. Both parties 
appealed to the Labour Appeal Court and this court confirmed all thirty-five dismissals. 
Subsequently the Nkatu workers came to the labour court, five weeks after the Nomoyi 
workers and when that court dismissed their applications they proceeded to the Labour 
Appeal Court. The application for the recusal of the two Judges of the Labour Appeal Court 
was based on the judgment given by the court in the Nomoyi matter. The applicants argued 
that the facts of the cases were the same and that the Labour Appeal Court's "findings" in the 
Nomoyi matter, specifically the findings of what happened on 21 June, had led to a mental 
picture which the judges would find difficult to abandon. These findings were a 
condemnation of the conduct of the union, which the applicants considered critical, as it was 
important in determining whether the protesters had a common purpose. Furthermore, the 
applicants alleged that the credibility of three witnesses had already been pronounced upon in 
Nomoyi. Their reliance on these issues was not to assess whether the judges were justified in 
their conclusions but the apprehension it would cause in the minds of reasonable persons in 
the position of applicants. The majority of the Constitutional Court held that there was no 
basis for the allegation because there was no live and significant issue in the Nkatu appeal on 
which (or about the credibility of a witness significant to which) the judges expressed "clear 
views" in Nomoyi.79
                                            
77  Referred to by the court as Nkatu who was the first applicant. 
78  Referred to by the Court as Nomoyi who was the first applicant. 
 The court held that the events of the June 21 march were not an issue in 
79  The court adopted the test in Livesey v New South Wales Bar Association (1983) 151 CLR 288 where the 
court held that a fair-minded observer might entertain a reasonable apprehension of bias if a judge sits to 
hear a case at first instance after he has, in a previous case, expressed clear views either about a question 
of fact which constitutes a live and significant issue in the subsequent case or about the credit of a witness 
whose evidence is of significance on such question of fact. The court doubted whether the case of R v T 
1953 (2) SA 479 (A) was good law. Counsel for the employer relied on this case as authority that "there 
was no rule in South Africa which lays down that a judge in cases other than appeals from his judgments is 
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the Nomoyi trial as the court was not asked to pronounce on the merits and demerits of that 
march, but on the justification of the dismissals. Consequently a reasonable litigant would 
attribute appreciably less significance to the courts' recounting of the background evidence. 
Moreover the court held that: 
… the presumption of judicial impartiality will apply with added force in an 
appellate court, where the law rightly supposes that the reasonable litigant will have 
knowledge of the institutional aspects that operate to guarantee a fair appreciation of 
his or her appeal.80
In addition, there were obstacles in the way of applicants in furnishing "cogent" and 
"convincing" evidence of reasonably apprehended bias. The court further noted that the 
evidence of certain observations made by one of the judges
 
81 was not canvassed before the 
Labour Appeal Court, thus depriving the judges of an opportunity of hearing the arguments 
and their comments thereon.82
… we are fully confident that, given their training and experience, the judges 
concerned would be able to set aside any knowledge gained in the course of their 
 The minority stressed that it was not the influence of the 
knowledge of the first trial on the second trial that was in issue by stating that: 
                                                                                                                                       
disqualified from sitting in a case merely because in the course of his judicial duties he has previously 
expressed an opinion in that case". In that case the Appellate Division dismissed the contention that a 
magistrate ought to have recused himself because on uncontested evidence, he had found one party to a 
sexual act guilty, and thereafter on contested evidence in a second trial where the previous accused was 
called to testify for the prosecution, he convicted the other party. They also contended that R v T had been 
approved in R v Somciza 1990 (1) SA 361 (A) and had been cited in SARFU 2. In R v Somciza the 
Appellate Division held that a magistrate whose decision convicting an accused had been set aside on 
appeal should not preside at a resumed hearing. The magistrate had made "strong credibility findings" in 
respect of all State witnesses in which he accepted their evidence. The court in R v Somciza had 
distinguished R v T on the grounds that he was trying a different accused person. The Constitutional Court 
held that the SARFU 2 Court cited R v T as "authority for the proposition that Canadian case dealing with 
the presumption that a judicial officer will act impartially in any matter that he or she is called upon to 
decided were consistent with our law". It was not necessary in SARFU 2 to consider the application of that 
principle to the facts in R v T, and SARFU 2 is not authority for the proposition that the failure of the 
magistrate to recuse himself in such circumstances would be consistent with the substantive elements of 
the constitutional right to a fair trial. In any event, for R v T to constitute good law today, it would have to 
survive the test set out above, namely whether the magistrate had already in the earlier trial decided an 
issue that was "live and significant" in the second trial (par 38).  
80  Par 43. 
81  The observations include a comment in allowing the employer's cross appeal in Nomoyi that those 
employees who were under final warning for the June 21 episode in the Nkatu episode and dismissed in 
Nomoyi "doubly deserved to be dismissed". Secondly, the judge referred to the confrontational attitude 
displayed by the workers leaders and by SACCAWU. Thirdly, in determining the character of the August 
demonstration, the judge referred to the determination of the union to build on the defiant image it had 
begun to establish in June 1995.  
82  The minority was quick to point out the need to put substance over form. 
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hearing of the first matter and disabuse themselves of any opinion they may have 
formed.83
Indeed the events and findings appear to overlap so closely that the applicants fear 
that they will not get the 'fair hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another 
independent and impartial tribunal or forum' guaranteed by section 34 of the 
Constitution. We believe that any lay litigant in the position of the applicants would 
entertain such apprehension, and that in the very special circumstances of the case 
where forceful pronouncements by the judges' concerned have already been made 
on crucial matters in issue, they would not do so unreasonably.
 
In their opinion the critical issue was the apprehension of the lay litigant. The minority 
contended that: 
84
It is important to note that the court was unanimous that an "actual, live concrete and highly 
relevant issue" is a critical factor in the apprehension of bias.
 
85
Given the position of the minority, in SACCAWU 1, it is arguable that the decision in SARFU 
2 would have been different. Be that as it may, it is possible to explain the decision in 
SARFU 2 on its unique facts. Accordingly, it is probable that the prospect that the whole 
court or a majority of the court would have recused themselves creating a constitutional 
vacuum because it would have been unconstitutional for any other court to hear the case, is 
the underlying rationale for the decision in that case. This fact, evident in the consideration of 
the court,
 While the majority sought to 
show that this was not present in this case, the minority sought to prove that it was present 
and sufficient to substantiate a reasonable apprehension from a lay litigant's perception. 
While it is agreed that that the minority were correct as to the interpretation of the cognizable 
apprehension, it may have been wiser to have insisted only on the apprehension of the lay 
litigant. An attempt to prove the live and actual issue again - entirely consistent with the 
reasonable person test - is the path to the replacement of the opinion of the reasonable and 
fair-minded observer with that of the court. 
86
                                            
83  Par 57. 
84  Par 60. 
85  Par 63. 
86  Note par 9: "This Court sits en banc and all of its available members are expected to sit in every case. Its 
quorum is eight of its members. If the five judges were to have recused themselves the quorum would 
have been broken and the appeal would not have been able to proceed." 
 may in some sense have driven the court to import the presumption of judicial 
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impartiality as a reaction to judge-shopping. It would have been appropriate for the majority 
in SACCAWU 1 to have realised this point and departed from it, even if indirectly. This is the 
path that the minority took. Unpleasant as it appears, it is submitted that an application of the 
minority judgment would find an apprehension of bias from a reasonable lay litigant's view 
in SARFU 2. If nothing else, the correspondence between Chaskalson P and the applicants87 
for recusal sustains this bias along with the specific allegations made against the whole court 
and specific judges.88 This is more so as the court agreed to a "basket approach" which was 
to take into account the cumulative effect of the facts and complaints made against the judges 
concerned.89
An unfounded or unreasonable apprehension concerning a judicial officer is not a 
justifiable basis for such application. The apprehension of a reasonable person must 
be assessed in the light of true facts as they emerge at the hearing of the application. 
It follows that incorrect facts which were taken into account by an applicant must be 
ignored in applying the test.
 The presumption of judicial impartiality and its component parts enabled the 
court to seek "cogent" and "convincing" reason to rebut the presumption. In doing this, the 
court may have been looking for proof of actual bias. This is evident in the opinion of the 
court that:  
90
As stated earlier, the practical effect of the reasonable apprehension test is to raise the 
threshold for the finding of apparent bias. In this sense it resembles the "real 
danger/likelihood" test formulated in Gough. If a litigant has to discharge the onus of 
rebutting the presumption of judicial impartiality with "cogent" evidence that is akin to a 
proof of the bias, it is without doubt similar to the "real danger/likelihood of bias" test 
 
                                            
87  In a reply seeking clarification on the relationship between members of the Constitutional Court and Mr 
Nelson Mandela, the then President of the Republic of South Africa, Chaskalson P replied and stated thus: 
"If the case has political overtones that is of no concern to the Court. Its duty is to decide the case in 
accordance with the law and the evidence and that is what it will do. The suggestion that your client has 
reason to believe that because he and Mr Mandela are leaders of a political parties, and because the judges 
of this court have been appointed by Mr Mandela, he might not get a fair hearing, and that under those 
circumstances members of this [C]ourt might not be objectively and impartially able to adjudicate on the 
credibility of the President, is improper and without substance … There is no basis for the slander of the 
Court contained in your letter". Ibid par 12. 
88  The allegations were that every member of the Constitutional Court would be biased against him and that 
as a result he would not get fair hearing. In addition to the general averments, the applicant went ahead to 
make specific averments pertaining to the President and Deputy President of the Court and three of its 
members, Kriegler, Sachs and Yacoob jj. The allegations concerned political social family and personal 
relationships with Mr Nelson Mandela, the then President of the Republic of South Africa.  
89  Ibid at par 49. 
90  Par 45 (emphasis supplied). 
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It is the opinion that the interpretation of the reasonable apprehension test laid down by the 
minority in SACCAWU 1 is far more acceptable. Even at that, there are still some misgivings 
with their approach. However as argued above, the use of the word "reasonable" really turns 
the test into what the court regards as "reasonable" and not what the lay litigant apprehends. 
It is for this reason that the manifest justice principle is advocated to guide the courts in their 
assessment of the facts alleged to sustain that apparent bias. Using the principle will 
continually remind the courts of the need to maintain public confidence in administration of 
justice. 
A review of the cases of applications for recusal based on the SARFU 2 test follows. What 
these cases indicate is that while they acknowledge that the test is that of reasonable 
apprehension, in line with SARFU and SACCAWU 1, their interpretation of the test differs. 
While some of the courts apply the test as interpreted by the majority, some others adopt the 
minority interpretation in SACCAWU 1. 
Some of the cases relate to the conduct of judicial officers a quo. The applications for recusal 
in these cases bring to the fore policy tensions between the need to prevent judge-shopping 
and the maintenance of public confidence in the administration of justice. While it may seem 
that the SARFU 2 test may be an excellent means of resolving this tension, it is also possible 
that the reasonable suspicion test applied from the perspective of the "reasonable, objective 
and informed litigant in possession of the correct facts" may also be worthy, as demonstrated 
by the Supreme Court of Appeal who used the test without recourse to the presumption of 
judicial impartiality in the case of Take & Save Trading v Standard Bank.91 In the course of 
the plaintiff's case and at a crucial stage when the last of the plaintiff's witnesses were to be 
cross-examined, the defendants' legal team withdrew without proffering any reason. The 
defendants represented by one of them applied for a postponement of the trial. The learned 
trial judge debated the merits of the postponement with him. During the course of the debate, 
the judge expressed in no uncertain terms that he thought that there was little merit in two 
aspects of the defendant's case, that the postponement would have amounted to an exercise in 
futility and that since the other defenses depended on the defendant's evidence, that he could 
proceed to give his evidence without the benefit of counsel. Eventually the judge granted a 
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postponement. When the matter came up again, the defendants now represented by another 
counsel applied by way of notice of motion for the judge to recuse himself. He refused the 
application and the subsequent one for leave to appeal, hence the appeal. Harms j reviewed 
the evidence painstakingly and concluded that: 
… a deadly legal point forcefully made by the court during argument cannot give 
rise to an impression of bias in the eye of the 'reasonable, objective and informed' 
litigant in possession of the 'correct facts'.92
The court quoted approvingly the dictum of Schreiner JA in R v Silber:
 
93
The grounds relied upon for suggesting bias were not facts outside the course of 
proceedings such as are ordinarily put forward as reasons why the judicial officer in 
question should not try the case. The grounds related to purely to what had 
happened in the course of the trial. Neither counsel has been able to find any 
reported case in which an application for recusal has been made in the course of a 
trial on the ground that the judicial officer has shown bias by his conduct of the 
proceedings. And this is not surprising, since the ordinary way of meeting any 
apparent bias shown by the court in its conduct of the proceedings would be by 
challenging his eventual decision in an appeal or review. Bias as it is used in this 
connection, is something quite different from a state of inclination towards one side 
in the litigation caused by evidence and argument and it is difficult to suppose that 
any lawyer could believe that a recusal might be based on a mere indication, before 
the pronouncement of the judgment, that the court thinks that at that stage one or the 
other party has the better prospects of success … Indeed a court may in proper case 
call upon a party to argue out of the usual order, thus clearly indicating that its 
provisional view favours the other party, but no reasonable person, least of all a 
person trained in the law, would think of ascribing this provisional attitude to, or 
identifying it with, bias.
 
94
In Sager v Smith,
 
This decision demonstrates that it is not every allegation or "mere suspicion" that can sustain 
an allegation of bias. 
95
                                                                                                                                       
91  N 4. 
92  Ibid par 17. 
93  R v Silber 1952 (2) SA 475. 
94  Ibid par 7. 
 the Supreme Court of Appeal applied the SARFU 2 test to find that the 
magistrate whose recusal was sought neither said nor did anything to give rise to a reasonable 
apprehension that he was biased against the defendant and that no reasonable person would 
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entertain such belief on a proper appreciation of the facts. The complaints which formed the 
basis of the defendant's application for recusal related to rulings made by the magistrate in 
the course of the trial; the admission of photographs; the refusal to attend an inspection in 
loco and finally, comments that defendant's attorney was splitting hairs and wasting time on 
frivolous matters. The court examined each of the four grounds of complaint to find if there 
was any truth in them and in respect of the issue of comments conducted an interpretational 
exercise. Even though the decision of the court may be correct, it may have been better to 
weigh the complaints from the perspective of the reasonable litigant. The appropriate 
question would have been whether the four complaints do not raise a reasonable 
apprehension of bias.  
In SACCAWU v President, Industrial Tribunal,96
                                                                                                                                       
95   N 69. 
96  SACCAWU v President, Industrial Tribunal 2001(2) SA 277 (SCA) (hereafter SACCAWU 2). 
 the Supreme Court of Appeal did not use 
the presumption of impartiality, but rather sought to evaluate the conduct alleged to be 
biased. In this case, the applicants were dismissed from their employment for a number of 
reasons. The dismissed workers and their union brought an application before a tribunal that 
included an attorney for relief due to an unfair labour practice. In reaction to the verdict of 
the tribunal dismissing their claim, the applicants alleged bias on the part of two of the 
members of the tribunal. The applicants alleged that the tribunal treated their attorney 
discourteously, trying to show his ignorance. Another allegation, which for procedural 
reasons became the only issue for assessment of bias, is that an attorney, who is a member of 
the court told, them that they would have won the case had they hired him instead of their 
attorney. The court held that the comments did not constitute a reasonable apprehension of 
bias. The court deplored the conduct of the attorney, but explained away his conduct without 
even asking whether the applicants apprehended bias from the conduct of the member of the 
tribunal. It is the opinion that the court was wrong in evaluating the evidence rather than 
assessing the evidence from the viewpoint of the reasonable lay litigant. It is difficult to 
imagine the litigant that would not be alarmed when a member of the court rebukes him for 
hiring somebody else instead of himself. The litigant would walk away with the impression 
that the verdict of the court went the way it did because this point was being made. It cannot 
be imagined that any better example of self-interest should merit automatic disqualification. 
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Another case is Silwana v Magistrate for the District of Piketberg97 where the court adopted 
the SARFU 2 test, but used the reasonable impression of the litigants as a basis for 
assessment of the allegation that a reasonable apprehension of bias arises due to the fact that 
the magistrate who signed a search warrant was the person who presided over the trial and 
that certain portions of the affidavits had been deleted. The court, in holding that the two 
facts raised an apprehension of bias, stated that "[t]he reasonable apprehension by the person 
facing the judge is all important."98
The utility of the use of a reasonable apprehension test as opposed to mere suspicion is found 
in the cases of allegations of bias arising from the personal characteristics of the judicial 
officer rather than some personal conduct. Thus in S v Collier,
 If the presumption of judicial impartiality had been used 
as the threshold it may have been possible to argue, as the magistrate did in refusing the 
application for the recusal, that his training was such that any evidence obtained in the course 
of the issuance of the search warrant will not affect him during the trial. The court was right 
to depend on the apprehension of the litigants as to the contents of the missing part of the 
affidavit. Not even the assurance by the prosecutor that the missing part of the affidavit was 
the identity of the informants could sway the court.  
99 the court made it clear that 
bias cannot exist simply because of the race of the judge.100 In Shackell v S,101
                                            
97  Silwana v Magistrate for the District of Piketberg [2003] 3 All SA 350 (C). 
98  Ibid at p 355. 
99  S v Collier 1995 (8) BCLR 975 (C). 
100  Cf Wildlife Society of Southern Africa v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism of the Republic of 
South Africa [1996] 3 All SA 462 (Tk). In this case an application of recusal on the fact that the judge 
lived in an area that was subject matter of litigation was rejected.  
101 Shackell v S [2001] 4 All SA 279 (A). 
 the Supreme 
Court of Appeal reaffirmed this principle. Using the SARFU 2 test, it assessed an application 
for recusal of a black judge on the grounds that the judge's son had been killed by white 
policemen and as such, the applicant, a white policeman would not get a fair trial because the 
black judge would be biased on account of the similarity of the death for which the 
policeman is charged and the brutal death of the judge's son. The appellant conceded that the 
two incidents were too far apart to be of any consequence, but alleged that the decision of the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission on an amnesty application by the white policeman 
who killed the judge's son was imminent and thus the facts of the previous case would be 
fresh in the judge's mind. The court held that: 
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… the norm of the reasonable man is, of course, a legal standard. In bringing that 
legal standard to bear on the present facts the appellant in my view has failed by a 
substantial margin to rebut the weighty onus which rested on him.102
In this section the test for judicial bias in Canada and Australia, which is the reasonable 
apprehension test, will be considered.  As stated above, the reasonable apprehension test in 
South Africa was based on the decision of the Canadian Supreme Court in R v S (RD).
 
These are welcome judgments, lest every personal characteristic such as religious, gender 
and sexual inclination will become without more a reason for objection. It is also important 
to note that there may be circumstances where, by the conduct of the judicial officer, some 
personal characteristic becomes in issue, just as seen in Timmins v Gormley – one of the 
Locabail cases. 
It is evident from the consideration of the cases that the minority opinion in SACCAWU 1 
remains very attractive and should be cause for reflection by the Constitutional Court so that 
it may reconsider the test as laid down in SARFU 1 at the earliest opportunity. 
 
4 The reasonable apprehension test in Canada and Australia 
103
In Canada, the test for reasonable apprehension of test is that set out by de Grandpre j 
in Committee for Justice and Liberty v National Energy Board:
  It 
is instructive that the test in Australia is also the same and some of the leading cases in that 
country were relied upon in the decision of the majority in SACCAWU 1.  
104
… the apprehension of bias must be a reasonable one, held by reasonable and right-
minded persons, applying themselves to the question and obtaining thereon the 
required information … [T]hat test is 'what would an informed person, viewing the 
matter realistically and practically - having thought the matter through - conclude'. 
 
                                            
102  Ibid at p 286. 
103  N 65.  
104  Committee for Justice and Liberty v National Energy Board [1978] 1 SCR 369. Grandpré j wrote a 
dissenting opinion but his formulation was adopted by the majority and followed in subsequent cases such 
as Valente v Queen [1985] 2 SCR 673; R v Lippé [1991] 2 SCR 114; Ruffo v Conseil de la magistrature 
[1995] 4 SCR 267. 
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Would he think that it is more likely than not that [the decision-maker], whether 
consciously or unconsciously, would not decide fairly. The grounds for this 
apprehension must, however, be substantial and I … refus[e] to accept the 
suggestion that the test be related to the 'very sensitive or scrupulous conscience'. 
This test was adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in R v S (RD). In this case, a white 
police officer arrested a black 15-year-old who had allegedly interfered with the arrest of 
another youth. The accused was charged with unlawfully assaulting a police officer with the 
intention of preventing an arrest and unlawfully resisting a police officer in the lawful 
execution of his duty. The police officer and the accused were the only witnesses and their 
accounts of the relevant facts differed widely. The Youth court judge weighed the evidence 
and determined that the accused should be acquitted. While delivering her oral reasons, the 
judge remarked in response to a rhetorical question by the Crown, that police officers had 
been known to mislead the court in the past that they had been known to overreact 
particularly with non-white groups and that that would indicate a questionable state of mind. 
She also stated that her comments were not tied to the police officer testifying before the 
court. The Crown challenged these comments as raising a reasonable apprehension of bias. 
After the reasons had been given and after an appeal to the Nova Scotia Supreme Court (Trial 
Division) had been filed by the Crown, the judge issued supplementary reasons, which 
outlined in greater detail her impressions of the credibility of both witnesses and the context 
in which the comments were made. The Crown's appeal was allowed and a new trial was 
ordered on the basis that the judge's remarks gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. 
The judgment was by a majority of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal. The appeal to the 
Supreme Court of Canada rested on the issue whether the judge's comments in her reasons 
gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. The Supreme Court in a split decision (La 
Forest, L'Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier, Cory, McLachlin and Iacobucc jj in the majority and 
Lamer CJ, Sophinka and Major jj dissenting) held that the remarks by the judge did not raise 
a reasonable apprehension of bias. Cory j whose formulation of the test was adopted by the 
majority further amplified the test for bias. He said: 
This test has been adopted and applied for the past two decades. It contains a two-
fold objective element: the person considering the alleged bias must be reasonable, 
and the apprehension of bias itself must also be reasonable in the circumstances of 
the case. Further the reasonable person must be an informed person, with knowledge 
of all relevant circumstances, including the traditions of integrity and impartiality 
that form a part of the background and apprised also of the fact that impartiality is 
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one of the duties the judges swear to uphold…the reasonable person should also be 
taken to be aware of the social reality that forms the background to a particular case, 
such as societal awareness and acknowledgment of the prevalence of racism and 
gender bias in a particular community… a real likelihood or probability of bias must 
be demonstrated and… a mere suspicion is not enough. Regardless of the precise 
words used to describe the test, the object of the different formulations is to 
emphasize that the threshold for a finding of real or perceived bias is high. It is a 
finding that must be carefully considered since it calls into question an element of 
judicial integrity. The onus of demonstrating bias lies with the person who is 
alleging its existence. Further, whether a reasonable apprehension of bias arises will 
depend entirely on the facts of the case.105
[I]n considering whether there was a real likelihood of bias, the court does not look  
at the mind of the justice himself or at the mind of the chairman of the tribunal or 
whoever it may be, who sits in a judicial capacity. It does not look to see if there 
was a real likelihood that he would, or did, in fact favour one side at the expense of 
the other. The court looks at the impression which would be given to other people. 
Even if he was as impartial as could be, nevertheless if right minded person would 
think that, in the circumstances, there was a real likelihood of bias on his part, then 
he should not sit …
 
Major j wrote the dissenting opinion and adopted the test elaborated by Denning mr in 
Metropolitan Properties: 
106
In Australia, the case of Livesey v New South Wales Bar Association
 
The split seen in the Canadian Supreme Court on the proper interpretation of the reasonable 
apprehension test is, as is seen to be present and not surprisingly in the South African 
Constitutional Court as evident in SACCAWU 1. 
107 represented a new108
… [a] judge should not sit to hear a case if in all the circumstances the parties or the 
public might entertain a reasonable apprehension that he might not bring an 
impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question involved in it.
 
and different approach in the tests for judicial bias. The court held that: 
109
                                            
105  Par 111-114 (emphasis original, references omitted). 
106  N 32 at 599. 
107  N 79. 
108  See the cases of Dickason v Edwards (1910) 10 CLR 243; R v Australian Stevedoring Industry Board; Ex 
parte Melbourne Stevedoring Co Pty Ltd (1953) 88 CLR 100.  
109  N 79 at 293-294. See also R v Watson; Ex parte Armstrong (1976) 136 CLR 248 (hereafter Watson); 
Australian National Industries Ltd v Spedley Securities Ltd (in Liq) (1992) 26 NSWLR 411. 
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In Webb v Queen110 the High Court of Australia was asked to reconsider its approach in 
Livesey and Watson in the light of the decision of the English House of Lords in Gough. It 
declined to do so. In Johnson v Johnson111
[f]or the reason that it gives due recognition to the fundamental principle that justice 
must both be done, and be seen to be done. It is based upon the need for public 
confidence in the administration of justice…the hypothetical reasonable observer of 
the judge's observer of the judge's conduct is postulated in order to emphasise that 
the test is objective, is founded in the need for public confidence in the judiciary, 
and is not based purely upon the assessment by some judges of the capacity and 
performance of their colleagues. At the same time, two things need to be 
remembered: the observer is taken to be reasonable; and the person being observed 
is a professional judge whose training, tradition and oath of affirmation require [the 
judge] to discard the irrelevant, the immaterial and the prejudicial. Whilst the 
fictional observer, by reference to whom the test is formulated, is not to be assumed 
to have a detailed knowledge of the law, or of the character or ability of the 
particular judge, the reasonableness of any suggested apprehension of bias is to be 
considered in the context of ordinary judicial practice.
 the High Court of Australia elaborated the 
reasonable apprehension test. In that case the court reached a unanimous decision on the facts 
there was a fundamental difference in the interpretation of the test consistent with our 
analysis of the position in South Africa and Canada. Glesson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, 
Gummow and Hayne jj believed that the reasonable apprehension of bias test has been 
adopted: 
112
The test which the law calls for interposes a fictitious bystander. It hypothesizes a 
person whose judgment in the matter is taken to be determinative. One might 
consider that the fiction should not be taken too far … the interposition of the 
fictitious bystander and the adoption of a criterion of disqualification expressed in 
terms of possibilities rather than "high probability" are both intended to serve an 
important social interest…Each of these considerations lays emphasis on the need to 
consider the complaint made ultimately, not by what adjudicators and lawyers 
know, but by how matters might reasonably appear to the parties and the public. 
That is why one does not attribute to the fictitious bystander highly specialized 
knowledge, such as that known perhaps to only some lawyers concerning the 
supposed inclinations and capacities of a particular adjudicator. It is also why it 
  
Kirby j proffered a different interpretation by focusing on the knowledge to be imputed to the 
reasonable observer as being determinative. In his opinion:  
                                            
110  Webb v Queen (1994) 181 CLR 41. 
111  Johnson v Johnson [2000] HCA 48 (hereafter Johnson). 
112  Ibid par 12-13. References omitted. 
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would be a mistake for a court simply to impute all that was eventually known to the 
court to an imaginary reasonable person because to do so would be only to hold up a 
mirror to itself.113
Does the law assume that the bystander is simply a member of the public who may 
have sat in the back of the court room and heard no more than the particular 
statement of the primary judge about which the appellant complains? Most members 
of the public, if they visit the courts at all, stay only for matter of minutes, rarely for 
hours, and almost never for days. Even parties, if represented, may absent 
themselves entirely or for extended periods of time. Does the law presume that, to 
make the hypothesized decision, given its serious consequences the fictitious 
bystander will secure acquaintance with at least the five considerations mentioned 
above.
 
Kirby j highlighted the possibility that the fictitious bystander may be a throwback to the real 
danger test in Gough. He said: 
114 If such knowledge is to be attributed to the bystander, does that fact 
undermine the modern test adopted by this court and restore once again the 
restrictive judgment according to the opinion of lawyers rather than the public? 
Would that be effectively to shift the balance back to the test … at least towards the 
"real danger" test adopted by the House of Lords in Gough despite its recent 
rejection by this Court in Webb?115
It is remarkable that in subsequent cases, the High Court of Australia has become polarized 
along these lines with Kirby j dissenting from the majority of the court in holding that the 
correct interpretation of the reasonable apprehension test is the apprehension of the public, 
while the majority of the court imputes the reasonable man with the court's knowledge of the 
facts. 
 
116
                                            
113  Ibid, par 48-49. 
114  These considerations are listed in par 46 ibid and can be summarised as follows: (1) Appellate judges 
realise that most judges strive to be independent and impartial and to make adjustments for factors of 
which they are aware might affect their decision. (2) A judge need not be silent in the course of the 
proceedings and a frank dialogue may serve the interests of justice. (3) Preliminary inclinations by judicial 
officers do change. (4) The adversary system depends on a vigorous interaction not only between the 
parties and their representatives but also between the judge and other persons. (5) Unlike before when 
judges discerned the truth based on their impressions of witnesses, now their decisions are based on 
indisputable facts, contemporary documents and logic of the circumstances. 
115  Ibid par 50. 
116  See Hot Holdings Pty Ltd v Creasy [2002] HCA 51. 
 The analysis above indicates quite clearly that the threshold of judicial bias is high 
in Canada and accordingly, is high in South Africa. The illuminating analysis of Kirby j in 
Johnson supports the contention that the interpretation of the reasonable apprehension test in 
SARFU 2 makes the test similar to the real danger/likelihood of bias test in Gough. This 
similarity lies in the high threshold. 
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8 Concluding remarks 
The interpretation of the manifest justice principle as the context for the application of the 
tests for recusal will lower the threshold of bias, thereby allowing more application for 
recusal to succeed. For the administration of justice, this is of considerable importance. It 
means that where a case is on the borderline, it should be resolved in favour of recusal. The 
difficulty that the test in SARFU 2 presents is that since the threshold is high, it is unlikely 
that a presiding officer being asked to recuse himself will invariably apply the objective legal 
value and rule that because of his training, such facts as alleged as leading to an apprehension 
of bias have indeed not affected him. For example, it is arguable that applying the SARFU 2 
test, the judge and the appellate court in Moch would have ruled that the strenuous efforts 
made by the judge a quo were aimed at establishing an objective legal value which the 
applicant for recusal had not rebutted, especially as the applicant was depending on 
information received on an alleged strained relationship between the judge and her counsel. 
Accordingly, it is submitted that the Constitutional Court of South Africa should adopt the 
interpretation of the minority in SACCAWU 1 to enable the manifest justice principle to be 
applied. It is further submitted that the emergence of South Africa from the apartheid era 
demands such a low threshold to build public confidence. The choice of Canadian 
jurisprudence in this regard is with due respect wrong. As seen, it flew in the face of 
established local jurisprudence and has put South Africa in a position similar to the English 
position in Gough, which the English have moved from and from which the Appellate 
Division in BTR Industries and the world refused to follow.   
This advocacy of the manifest justice principle hinges on the fact that the minority view of 
the reasonable apprehension test similar to the reasonable suspicion test is also capable of so 
much manipulation as it is very easy to determine what a reasonable person should think, 
especially when it is the court that personifies that reasonable person. It is the principle that 
will ensure that such manipulations do not become common-place. The principle enables the 
reasonable man to be fit into the place of the lay litigant without knowledge of judicial 
traditions and practice. In other words, the present objective nature of the reasonable 
suspicion test would be infused with a considerable amount of the subjective elements that 
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the lay litigant would personify.  Applying the manifest justice principle recognises the fact 
that applications for recusal should not be perceived by the judicial officers to be a personal 
affront and an indictment of their integrity. This is a point that is trite yet has not been 
influential. The need for public confidence demands that judicial officers swallow their ego 
and put the system above their personal sentiments. 
In applying the manifest justice principle, there is the increased possibility that litigants may 
use it for judge-shopping. It is acknowledged that this is a veritable criticism of the manifest 
justice principle as one cannot rule out frivolous attacks on judicial officers for the purposes 
of judge-shopping or embarrassment. In any case, it is implicit in the manifest justice 
principle that it is advocated that frivolous and embarrassing attacks on the judiciary will 
have no place. Even the constructed lay litigant should be able to discern such cases and 
enable courts to dismiss such applications. 
There is no doubt that a low threshold will exact a considerable cost on the judiciary. 
However any price is worth paying for this confidence. In this regard the opinion of Lord 
Bruckmaster in Sellar v Highland Rly117 approved in Pinochet 2118
                                            
117  Sellar v Highland Rly 1919 SC (HL) 19.  
118  N 7 p 593. 
  is apposite: 
The law remains unaltered and unvarying to-day, and although it is obvious that the 
extended growth of personal property and the wide distribution of interests in vast 
commercial concerns may render the application of the rule irksome, it is 
nonetheless a rule which I for my part should greatly regret to see even in the 
slightest degree relaxed. The importance of preserving the administration of justice 
from anything which can even by remote imagination infer a bias or interest in the 
Judge upon whom falls the solemn duty of interpreting the law is so grave that any 
small inconvenience experienced in its preservation may be cheerfully endured.  
It is hoped that the South African Constitutional Court would, as the English House of Lords 
has indicated in Lawal, at the earliest opportunity, move decisively to lower the threshold of 
judicial bias. In doing this it will give real and substantive meaning to the constitutional 
injunctions requiring impartial adjudication of disputes. 
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